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We have told Beijing that we alone know the true value of the dollar-
yuan exchange rate and have the authority to unilaterally penalize 
Chinese companies for pricing their products using the official exchange 
rate. . . . [T]here is little evidence that a stronger yuan1 would reduce the 
U.S. trade deficit with China or improve the jobs picture.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a turn of events over the past decade, the United States has seen an 
economic downturn both nationally and globally not experienced since the Great 
Depression.3 At the center of this financial crisis is the high unemployment rate 
and crushing trade deficit.4 Reports suggest more than 2.7 million jobs have been 
displaced due to outsourcing to the People’s Republic of China (“China”), where 
wages are extremely low and the cost of doing business in China is significantly 
cheaper than in the United States.5 Combined with China’s government-
controlled currency exchange rate, U.S.-produced goods are unable to compete 
with goods imported from China both in the United States and on an international 
level.6 
On the other hand, China’s economy has grown dramatically over the past 
decade,7 resulting in a tremendous trade surplus over the United States.8 In 2003, 
the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that the U.S. trade deficit with 
China was at $124 billion,9 a twenty percent increase from the previous year.10 
And one decade later in 2013, the U.S. trade deficit with China has more than 
 
1. “Yuan” is often used synonymously with Renmibi (“RMB”), meaning “The People’s Money,” the 
official currency of China. See Claus D. Zimmermann, Exchange Rate Misalignment and International Law, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 423, n.1 (2011). 
2. James A. Dorn, China and the Truth About the Senate’s Exchange Rate Oversight Act, CATO 
INSTITUTE (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-truth-about-senates-exchange-
rate-oversight-act.  
3. Global Economic Crisis, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/global-economic-
crisis (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).  
4. See Fred Moseley, The U.S. Economic Crisis: Causes and Solutions, INT’L SOCIALIST REV., Mar.-Apr. 
2009, http://www.isreview.org/issues/64/feat-moseley.shtml.  
5. Robert E. Scott, The China Toll: Growing U.S. Trade Deficit with China Cost More Than 2.7 Million 
Jobs Between 2001 and 2011, with Job Losses in Every State, ECON. POL’Y INST., http://www.epi.org/ 
publication/bp345-china-growing-trade-deficit-cost/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).  
6. See Arthur Pinkasovitch, What a Rising Yuan Means for You, FORBES (May 12, 2010, 1:40 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/12/yuan-currency-investing-personal-finance-yuan-investing.html. 
7. GDP Growth (Annual %), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. 
MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
8. China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2013).  
9. Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/ 
c5700.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
10. Id. 
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doubled to a staggering $290.6 billion.11 Many, including Robert E. Scott at the 
Economic Policy Institute,12 have named “currency manipulation” as a major 
cause of the U.S.-China trade deficit.13 
Beginning in 2003, a series of currency exchange rate bills to combat China’s 
“currency manipulation” have been introduced to Congress.14 On October 11, 
2011, the U.S. Senate passed The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform 
Act of 2011 (“Act”) with a vote of 63-35.15 The Act would allow the U.S. 
government to impose countervailing duties on Chinese goods if it deems that 
China is undervaluing its currency.16 Its proponents claim that China’s policies in 
interfering with the appreciation of its currency, along with its subsidies in 
certain growth industries, provide its domestic export industries with an unfair 
competitive advantage.17 Thus, U.S. firms are forced to choose between 
outsourcing jobs and going out of business.18 On the other hand, critics call the 
Act economic protectionism and a potential risk of a trade war with China, which 
is the last thing the United States wants during its financial crisis.19 Similarly, 
China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxu, believes the United States is 
“politicizing” the currency exchange issue and that if this bill passes, its 
enactment will be a “[grave violation of] the rules of the World Trade 
Organisation and severely upset China-U.S. economic and trade relations.”20 
Despite its popularity in the Senate and its publicity in the media,21 the Act failed 
 
11. Id. 
12. Scott, supra note 5; Michele Nash-Hoff, U.S.-China Trade Deficit Cost More than 2.1 Million 
Manufacturing Jobs, CAN AM. MANUFACTURING BE SAVED? (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://savingusmanu 
facturing.com/blog/outsourcing/u-s-china-trade-deficit-cost-more-than-2-1-million-manufacturing-jobs/; Trade 
Deficit with China has Cost 2.8 Million U.S. Jobs over Past Decade, New Study Finds, AM. 
MANUFACTURING.ORG (Sept. 20, 2011), http://americanmanufacturing.org/press-releases/trade-deficit-china-
has-cost-28-million-us-jobs-over-past-decade-new-study-finds. 
13. Annie Lowrey, A Tightrope on China’s Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/10/23/us/politics/romney-pledge-to-call-china-a-currency-manipulator-poses-risks-experts-
say.html?_r=0; Daniel Barbeau, China’s Money Manipulation Will Backfire, THE DAILY TITAN (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.dailytitan.com/2012/10/chinas-money-manipulation-will-backfire/. 
14. See H.R. 3269, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3157, 109th Cong. (2005). 
15. S. 1619 Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, OPENCONGRESS, http://www. 
opencongress.org/bill/112-s1619/show (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); see also Trade with China: And Now, 
Protectionism, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21532288. 
16. Kathrin Hille, China Warns of ‘Trade War’ over US Bill, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b97e8834-ee3a-11e0-a491-00144feab49a.html#axzz1bf3NjMCC. 
17. Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, ‘Currency Manipulation’ and World Trade, 9 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 583, 584 (2010).  
18. See Michele Nash-Hoff, U.S. Lost 1.9 Million Manufacturing Jobs Due to Trade Deficit with China, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-nashhoff/us-china-trade-
deficit_b_984374.html; see also Robert E. Scott, Unfair China Trade Costs Local Jobs, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp260/. 
19. Trade with China: And Now, Protectionism, supra note 15. 
20. Hille, supra note 16. 
21. See generally Dorn, supra note 2; see generally Trade with China: And Now, Protectionism, supra 
note 15; see generally Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Jabs China Over Its Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), 
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to gain traction in the House of Representatives and died without further 
progress.22 However, given the continuing relevance of China’s exchange rate 
policy on the rising U.S. trade deficit, a similar bill is likely to be introduced in 
current and future congressional sessions. 
Notwithstanding the difference in opinion regarding the Act, there 
unquestionably exists a close relationship “between monetary policy and 
international trade.”23 Depending on how a country’s central bank intervenes in 
foreign exchange markets, it can either stimulate or impede imports and exports.24 
China, for example, is under heavy criticisms by the United States for regularly 
intervening into its foreign exchange markets in order to prevent the RMB from 
appreciating relative to other currencies,25 which has resulted in global trade 
surpluses26 that are used to heavily subsidize its domestic industries.27 However, 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) policies require the United States to bring 
a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to demonstrate 
how China’s alleged “currency manipulation . . . materially injured” competing 
U.S. industries.28 
Part II of this Comment discusses the current Chinese policies on foreign 
exchange and its effects on the United States’ trade deficits and jobs. Part III 
examines the rules and regulations under IMF and WTO that govern the foreign 
exchange markets. Part IV looks at past efforts by the United States to implement 
domestic laws that regulate foreign exchange markets. Part V discusses the recent 
effort by the United States in combating China’s “currency manipulation” and 
articulates how it changes current laws. Part VI then concludes that the United 
States may find the power of action in inaction, and that the Chinese government 




22. See S. 1619 (112th): Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US, 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1619 (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
23. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 583.  
24. Id. at 583-84. 
25. Robert E. Scott, Currency Manipulation—History Shows that Sanctions are Needed, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.epi.org/publication/pm164/. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 584. 
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II. CHINA’S HISTORICAL AND CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES AND THEIR 
EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES’ TRADE DEFICITS AND JOBS 
A.  China’s Policies 
China regularly intervenes in its foreign exchange markets.29 In an effort to 
control its currency exchange rates, China “pegs”30 foreign exchange rates by 
either releasing currencies into the market to relieve excess demands or by 
purchasing exchange reserves to soak up excess supply.31 On the contrary, other 
countries may choose to allow their currencies to “float”32 and let their values to 
be determined by free market forces.33 “Most of the major currencies, including 
the dollar, the Euro, the [Japanese] yen and the British pound, now float.”34 
Despite China’s enormous growth in world trade over the years, the RMB 
does not float.35 Prior to 1994, China employed a dual exchange rate system that 
consisted of an official fixed exchange rate system used by the government and a 
semi market-based system used by importers and exporters.36 In 1994, the 
Chinese government combined the two exchange rate systems and pegged the 
RMB at 8.70 yuan to the dollar, which increased to 8.28 yuan to the dollar by 
1997 and remained relatively constant until mid-2005.37 China rationalized their 
approach as a need to provide a relatively stable environment for foreign trade 
and investment while its country was in its early developmental stages.38 
In 2005, the Chinese government reformed its exchange rate system 
policies.39 It announced that the RMB would no longer be pegged, and that the 
RMB exchange rate would become “adjustable based on market supply and 
demand with reference to exchange rate movements of currencies in a basket” 
containing various currencies of major developed countries.40 The Chinese 
 
29. Jim Saxton, Chinese FX Interventions Caused International Imbalances Contributed to U.S. Housing 
Bubble, in THE CHINESE ECONOMY 97 (Benjamin A. Tyler ed., 2010). 
30. To “peg” a currency means to control the value of a currency through governmental actions.  
31. Scott, supra note 25. 
32. As oppose to “pegging” a currency, allowing a currency to “float” means to allow free market forces 
to determine the value of that currency. 
33. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 587. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 




40. Spokesman of the People’s Bank of China on the Reform of the RMB Exchange Rate Regime, THE 
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, para. 7 (July 25, 2005), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2001/ 
20015/20015_.html. However, the exact composition of the basket has never been revealed. WAYNE M. 
MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY POLICY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 2. 
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government believed a reform of the RMB exchange rate regime was necessary 
because while its trade surplus had continued to increase substantially, reaching 
$711 billion by the end of June 2005, it was experiencing intensifying trade 
frictions in the international arena.41 Furthermore, China believed this new regime 
would help create a more sustainable economic development strategy that 
focused on domestic demand and the improvement of resource allocation.42 The 
new regime aimed to preserve stability from the old regime while taking steps 
toward a more adaptive type of foreign exchange rate system that took into 
account the flow of foreign resources and markets.43 
Following this reform, the exchange rate of RMB was immediately adjusted 
from 8.28 yuan to 8.11 yuan on the U.S. dollar.44 Though the RMB would be 
allowed to fluctuate slightly in relations to the basket on a daily basis, China only 
allowed the RMB to appreciate at a very slow and steady pace.45 From mid-2005 
to mid-2008, the dollar-RMB exchange rate appreciated from 8.11 to 6.83,46 an 
appreciation of 20.8 percent (if the initial adjustment from 8.28 to 8.11 yuan is 
included).47 However, in response to the declining global demands for Chinese 
goods due their rising cost,48 the Chinese government suspended its exchange rate 
regime in mid-2008 and the exchange rate was held relatively constant at 6.83 
until mid-2010.49 In mid-2010, The People’s Bank of China decided to resume its 
RMB reform to “enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibility.”50 However, the 
Spokesperson cautioned against “any sharp and massive fluctuations of the RMB 
exchange rate,” claiming “the RMB exchange rate is moving closer to its 
equilibrium level.”51 On January 14, 2013, the yuan-dollar exchange rate was 
6.22.52 
 




44. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 2, 3. 
45. Id. at 3. 
46. Id. For clarification, appreciation of the dollar-RMB exchange rate represents a closer exchange rate 
gap between the dollar and the RMB. The closer the exchange rate is to zero, the more the RMB is worth on the 
exchange market in relations to the dollar.  
47. Id. 
48. An appreciation of RMB during 2005 to 2008 meant an increased in cost for U.S. consumers to 
purchase imported Chinese exports. This is caused by relative diminishment of the dollar’s purchasing power on 
Chinese goods as yuan appreciated.  
49. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 3. 
50. China Decides to Further Reform RMB Exchange Rate Regime, XINHUA (June 19, 2010), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2010-06/19/c_13358433.htm. 
51. Spokesperson of the People’s Bank of China Answers Questions on Further Reforming the RMB 
Exchange Rate Regime, THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA (June 21, 2010), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/ 
english/955/2010/20100622144355378529746/20100622144355378529746_.html. 
52. Currency Calculator (US Dollar, Chinese Yuan Renminbi)—X-Rates, X-RATES.COM, http://www.x-
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B.  Effects on the United States’ Trade Deficits and Jobs 
The effects on world trade due to government intervention into the foreign 
exchange market can be dramatic.53 As a result of the Chinese government’s 
intervention into RMB’s foreign exchange rate in an effort to control its 
appreciation, Chinese goods are exported at a cheaper rate, requiring less foreign 
currency to purchase.54 Conversely, its imports become more expensive, requiring 
more domestic currency to purchase foreign goods.55 
Economists contend that the undervalued RMB has been a major factor in the 
fast-growing U.S. trade deficit with China, which has skyrocketed from $10 
billion in 1990 to $273 billion in 2010.56 Some even argue that there is a “direct 
correlation between the U.S. trade deficit and U.S. job losses, especially in the 
manufacturing sector.”57 The government-controlled exchange rate in China 
caused Chinese exports to be comparatively inexpensive and U.S. exports to 
China to be comparatively expensive.58 Consequently, it became cheaper to 
purchase Chinese goods in the United States and more expensive to purchase 
U.S. goods in China.59 As a result, the U.S. imports a much greater amount of 
Chinese goods to meet the demands of its consumers, but it is simultaneously 
unable to export an equivalent amount of U.S. goods to China due to the low 
demand from Chinese consumers.60 Studies show that between 2001 and 2008, 
2.4 million jobs were lost or displaced as a result of the U.S. trade deficit with 
China, and analysts believe an appreciation in RMB would result in a more 
equalized import and export market and help create jobs in U.S. export 
industries.61 
Critics of China’s policy have argued that while a pegged currency regime 
was appropriate while China was in its early stages of economic development, it 
is no longer necessary or justified given China’s current economy and enormous 
growths in world trade.62 In fact, China is the world’s largest merchandise 
 
rates.com/calculator/?from=USD&to=CNY&amount=1.00 (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).  
53. See WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S 
CURRENCY POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 6-8. 
54. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 587-88. 
55. Id. 
56. Trade in Goods with China, supra note 9. 
57. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 8. 
58. Id. at 29-30. 
59. Id. 
60. Tibita Kaneene, Why China’s Currency Manipulation Doesn’t Matter, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 10, 
2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/09/why_chinas_currency_manipulation_doesnt_matter. 
61. Scott, supra note 18. 
62. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 6. 
[7] YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:15 PM 
2013 / The Power of Action in Inaction 
584 
exporter, accounting for approximately ten percent of global exports,63 and China 
also became the world’s second largest economy in 2010, surpassing Japan.64 To 
prevent the RMB from appreciating, China accumulated official foreign reserves 
amounting to $3.3 trillion.65 At the G-20 Meeting in South Korea on February 27, 
2010, the IMF stated that the RMB was “assessed to be substantially undervalued 
from a medium-term perspective.”66 Estimates by various organizations and 
scholars have concluded that the RMB is undervalued by twelve to fifty percent.67 
With such alarming statistics, the United States first looked to find solutions from 
the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
A.  Bretton Woods System 
After World War II, a series of conferences resulted in the creation of the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).68 The creations were known collectively as the 
Bretton Woods System.69 The System was intended to prevent future economic 
crisis and to promote the values of capitalism.70 A paramount concern during the 
Bretton Woods negotiations was the issue of free floating currencies and their 
potential detrimental effects on world trade.71 The parties to the negotiations 
agreed to adopt fixed exchange rates and to accept the role of the IMF as the 
global enforcer of monetary policy.72 Ironically, it was not until 1971 that the 
 
63. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 18, 22 
(2012) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf. 
64. Id. at 10 (Economists predict China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in the next 
decade.); Jennifer Liberto, Chinese VP: We Must Trust Each Other, CNN MONEY (Feb. 13, 2012, 4:36 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/15/news/international/china_xi_jinping/index.htm. 
65. Kenneth Rapoza, How Much Longer Can China Accumulate Reserves?, FORBES (May 29, 2012, 
11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/05/29/how-much-longer-can-china-accumulate-
reserves/. 
66. International Monetary Fund [IMF], Global Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges, at para. 5 
(Feb. 27, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/022710.pdf.  
67. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 17. 
68. Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944-71), INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/ 
external/about/histcoop.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013); M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Bretton Woods System, 
TIME MAGAZINE (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1852254,00.html; 
Understanding the WTO: Basics: The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
69. Stephey, supra note 68. 
70. See Cooperation and Reconstruction, supra note 68.  
71. See Benjamin J. Cohen, Bretton Woods System, BENJAMIN J. COHEN, http://www.polsci.ucsb. 
edu/faculty/cohen/inpress/bretton.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).  
72. See id.  
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United States discarded its fixed exchange rate policy and floated the dollar.73 
Thus, while a major goal of the Bretton Woods Conferences was to encourage 
free trade and open market, stability remained the central theme.74 
B. International Monetary Fund 
IMF was created in 1945 to “oversee[] the international monetary system to 
ensure exchange rate stability and [to] encourag[e] members to eliminate 
exchange restrictions that hinder trade.”75 All countries that have their own 
currency, including the United States and China, are currently members of the 
IMF.76 Up until the 1970s, the IMF implemented strict control over the exchange 
rate markets.77 It was never imagined that a country would be able to peg its 
currency as opposed to being guided by market forces.78 However, the IMF’s 
rules were changed in 1978 so that it no longer governed world exchange rates.79 
Currently, the IMF’s roles include handling global trade imbalances associated 
with “fundamental misalignment” or exchange rate “manipulation.”80 In 2007, the 
IMF explained the term “fundamental misalignment” as: 
When the underlying current account is not in equilibrium (which may 
be due to exchange rate policies but also to unsustainable domestic 
policies or to market imperfections), the exchange rate is “fundamentally 
misaligned.” In other words, fundamental exchange rate misalignment, 
an important indicator of external instability under the 2007 decision, is a 
deviation of the real effective exchange rate from its equilibrium level–
that is, the level consistent with a current account (stripped of cyclical 
and other temporary factors) in line with economic fundamentals.81 
  
 
73. China’s Exchange Rate Policy Not Violate WTO, CHINADAILY (Feb. 26, 2004, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/26/content_309623.htm. 
74. See Cooperation and Reconstruction, supra note 68.  
75. History, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/history.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 
2011). 
76. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 1 (2011). 
77. Id. at 3. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. See generally Sitikantha Pattanaik, Global Imbalances, Tanking Dollar, and the IMF’s Surveillance 
over Exchange Rate Policies, 27 CATO J. 299 (2007), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato. 
org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2007/11/cj27n3-1.pdf. 
81. Surveillance Guidelines: Landmark Framework for IMF Surveillance, INT’L MONETARY FUND, Box 
1 (June 21, 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/pol0621b.htm. 
[7] YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:15 PM 
2013 / The Power of Action in Inaction 
586 
Furthermore, the IMF stated: 
The IMF’s Articles of Agreement provide that member countries shall 
“avoid manipulating exchange rates . . . to prevent effective balance of 
payments adjustments or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over 
other member.” But the Fund had provided little guidance on what 
constitutes such exchange rate manipulation. The 2007 Decision on 
Bilateral Surveillance that the IMF’s Executive Board approved on June 
15 provides guidance to the IMF’s 185 member countries on that type of 
behavior that is at issue. 
The 2007 decision provides that a member would be “acting 
inconsistently with Article IV, Section 1 (iii)”, if the Fund determined it 
was both engaging in policies that are targeted at–and actually affect–the 
level of exchange rate, which could mean either causing the exchange 
rate to move or preventing it from moving; and doing so “for the purpose 
of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an 
undervalued exchange rate” in order “to increase net exports.”82 
For three reasons, the bilateral surveillance process is unlikely to have much 
influence on the exchange policies of China.83 First, a violation of Article IV, 
Section 1, is difficult to show.84 Under the IMF interpretation of Article IV stated 
above, manipulation to obtain unfair advantage occurs only when a member 
engages in policies “for the purpose” of creating fundamental misalignment to 
secure an increase in net exports.85 Traditionally, IMF has given incredible 
deference to sovereign countries and has not publicly challenged objectives 
statements put forth by countries that have exchange rate policies.86 In 
determining intent, the member is given “the benefit of any reasonable doubt.”87 
Therefore, China will surely rationalize their currency control as a means of 




83. See generally Michael Mussa, IMF Surveillance over China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Paper presented 
at the Conference on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.piie.com/ 
publicatiorns/papers/mussa1007.pdf. 
84. Id. 
85. Surveillance Guidelines, supra note 81. 
86. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 1-2 (2011). 
87. IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Surveillance, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 31, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=13919-(07/51 [hereinafter Exchange Arrangements 
and Surveillance]. 
88. See supra Part II.  
[7] YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:15 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
587 
Second, even if China’s policies are found to be in violation of Article IV, 
the history of bilateral surveillance suggests a strong preference in the IMF 
toward avoiding confrontation when powerful countries are involved.89 The 2007 
Board decision emphasizes that “[d]ialogue and persuasion” are key pillars of 
effective surveillance.90 The IMF’s “assessments and advice are intended to assist 
that member in making policy choices, and to enable other members to discuss 
these policy choices with that member.”91 In other words, the surveillance process 
is anything but adversarial, and much more grounded in persuasion and 
consensus.92 Indeed, since Article IV was ratified three decades ago, the number 
of consultations sought under its provisions has reached over forty thousand.93 
Yet, “[i]n none of these consultations has the Executive Board ever concluded 
that a member was out of compliance with its obligations regarding its exchange 
rate policies or any other matter!”94 
Finally, IMF has little practical leverage over a country like China.95 In 
theory, members in violation of IMF provisions can be punished through a 
curtailment of their access to Fund resources, suspension, or even expulsions 
from membership.96 However, the 2007 Board decision does not explicitly or 
implicitly mention that such sanctions will be deployed against violators of 
Article IV.97 In practice, IMF may threaten to cut off IMF borrowings if a 
member does not pursue the appropriate policies.98 China, however, has no need 
to borrow from the IMF and no prospect for such a need in the foreseeable future 
because it has trillions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves.99 Simply put, 
China is “insulated from the Fund’s criticism.”100 Although the 2007 Board 
Decisions allows IMF to exercise “firm surveillance” of inappropriate activities 
that result in fundamental misalignment or currency manipulation, IMF cannot 
compel a country to change its exchange rate.101 In other words, the IMF can only 
attempt to persuade countries by offering economic advice and trying to convince 
 
89. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 592-93. 
90. Surveillance Guidelines, supra note 81. 
91. IMF, Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, Dec. 2011, at 37, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/2012/123111.pdf. 
92. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 592-93. 
93. Mussa, supra note 83, at 40. 
94. Id. 
95. See infra note 74-81 and accompanying text.  
96. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. XXVI, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Agreement].  
97. See Exchange Arrangements and Surveillance, supra note 87. 
98. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 593. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. (quoting H.R. Torres, Reforming the International Monetary Fund—Why Its Legitimacy is at 
Stake, 10 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 433, 450 (2007). 
101. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 2 (2011). 
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them that a change in exchange rate might be in their best interest.102 But whether 
a country decides to change its policy is a decision that resides solely in that 
country alone.103 
C. World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 with the aim to 
“provide[] a forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to 
international trade and [to] ensur[e] a level playing field for all, thus contributing 
to economic growth development.”104 Both the United States and China are 
currently members of the WTO.105 Unlike the IMF and other international trade 
and finance organizations, the WTO has a way to enforce its policies.106 A 
country may file a complaint if it believes another country has violated WTO 
rules to its detriment, and argue their position in front of a dispute settlement 
panel.107 The panel then renders its judgment, and “if the losing party does not 
comply with the ruling within a reasonable period of time, the WTO may . . . 
authorize it to impose retaliatory measures . . . against the offending country or to 
take other appropriate retaliatory measures against that country’s trade.”108 This 
Comment explores two of the options under WTO law which the United States 
may utilize against China: a complaint based on the notion that China’s policies 
constitute an impermissible export subsidy and a complaint based on GATT 
Article XV.109 
1.  Impermissible Export Subsidy 
While WTO regulations expressly prohibit countries from providing 
subsidies to promote their national exports, it is heavily in dispute whether 
currency policies fall under the WTO’s jurisdiction.110 Under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCMs”), “subsidy” exists if “there is a 
financial contribution by a government involve[ing] a direct transfer of funds, 




104. About the WTO—A Statement by the Director-General, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
105. Members and Observers, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
106. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 2. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 2-3. 
109. See infra Part III.B.1-2.  
110. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 3. 
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infrastructure.”111 Furthermore, export subsidy is “contingent upon export 
performance”112 and must be “specific to an enterprise or industry” and not be 
applicable to all producers.113 Some argue that China’s currency-induced subsidy 
is neither contingent on export performance nor specific to an industry.114 Anyone 
who exchanges currency receives the same rate even if they are not exporting.115 
Others contend the alleged benefit of China’s policy only benefits the export 
industry while actually disadvantaging the import industry and consumers, thus 
satisfying the definition of an export subsidy under WTO’s rules.116 For example, 
a recent countervailing duty petition filed by U.S. producers of flexible magnets 
against Chinese importers alleges that when China lowers the value of the RMB, 
it makes imports more expensive so that consumers may buy fewer U.S. 
products.117 However, once again, Chinese exporters are not a direct beneficiary 
in this situation. For these reasons, an argument that China’s policies confer an 
impermissible export subsidy seems problematic on numerous fronts. 
2.  GATT Article XV 
As a condition of WTO membership, applicants are required to accept 
existing trade rules established by GATT.118 Article XV, entitled “Exchanged 
Arrangements,” contains nine paragraphs that would be the grounds for a 
possible WTO complaint.119 Article XV, paragraph 4, states that members “shall 
not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this 
Agreement.”120 One concern voiced at its drafting was over the meaning of 
“frustrating the intent of provisions,” which led to an interpretive note being 
added to the GATT.121 This note explains “that infringements of the letter of any 
 
111. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 275 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. 
112. Id. at art. 3, note 4; JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY 
MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND WTO 3. 
113. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 111, at art. 2.1; JONATHAN E. 
SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND WTO 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22658.pdf. 
114.  JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 3. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Raw Flexible Magnets from China and Taiwan, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-452/731-TA1129/731-TA1130, 
USITC Pub. 3961 (Nov. 2007) (Preliminary).  
118. See The 128 Countries that had Signed GATT by 1994, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).  
119. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 
1153 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
120. Id. at art. XV(4). 
121. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 482 (1969). 
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Article of this Agreement by exchange action shall not be regarded as a violation 
of that Article, if, in practice, there is no appreciable departure from the intent of 
the Article.”122 This note caused many to believe that it is “highly unlikely, if not 
impossible, to enforce rights and obligations under Article XV(4).”123 In fact, 
since the founding of the GATT in 1947, Article XV(4) has only come into 
practice once, in 1952.124 
Under Article XV(4), there is a differentiation between whether the action is 
based on exchange action or based on trade action.125 While there is little history 
in this area of the law, this differentiation was addressed in 1954 by a sub-group 
during a review session.126 The sub-group found that “in many instances it was 
difficult or impossible to define clearly whether a government measure is 
financial or trade in character and frequently it is both.”127 The sub-group noted 
that the differentiation is in practice “based on the technical nature of government 
measures rather than on the effect of these measures on international trade and 
finance.”128 
China’s exchange rate policy likely constitutes “exchange action.” The 
drafters of Article XV intended the term to be very encompassing.129 On the other 
hand, the language of “trade action” suggests that the “action” must be one of 
trade.130 Although China’s exchange rate policy has an obvious effect on its trade, 
the sub-group’s notes puts emphasis on the “technical nature” of the policy, 
rather than the effect the policy has on trade balance.131 Therefore, an action 
involving China’s practice would likely be categorized as an exchange action in a 
WTO dispute.132 
Whether or not China’s exchange rate policy “frustrates the intent of the 
provisions”133 of GATT is a sharply divided question among the commentators.134 
Unfortunately, “nothing in Article XV or elsewhere in GATT provides clear 
 
122. GATT 1994, supra note 119, at annex 1, art. XV(4); JACKSON, supra note 121, at 482. 
123. Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Leung, Is China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The Legitimacy of 
China’s Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework, 43 INT’L LAW. 1257, 1288 
(2009).  
124. RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE 1174 (2005).  




129. Dukgeun Ahn, Is the Contemporary Chinese Exchange-rate Regime “WTO Legal”?, in THE US-
SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE, NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW 1 (Simon Evenett ed., 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1605542. 
130. Id. at 2. 
131. See id. 
132. Ahn, supra note 129. 
133. GATT 1994, supra note 119, at art. XV(4) 
134. See Ahn, supra note 129, at 2. 
[7] YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:15 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
591 
guidance . . . as to what sorts of exchange practices would frustrate its intent.”135 
In fact, Article XV(4) has never been interpreted by the WTO, and no case law 
exists on the subject.136 
In adjudicating a claim under Article XV, WTO dispute process defers to the 
IMF on certain issues.137 Article XV(2) states that in all cases dealing with 
“problems concerning monetary reserves, balance of payments or foreign 
exchange arrangements,” GATT members must consult with the IMF and “shall 
accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to 
foreign exchange . . . and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to 
whether action by a contracting party . . . is in accordance with the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.”138 Thus, a violation of GATT 
Article XV depends on the existence of a violation of Article IV of the IMF 
Agreement.139 And as previously discussed, an action under the IMF Agreement 
would be problematic in practice.140 
D. Amending the Articles of the IMF or the WTO Agreements 
Recalling the United States’ limited options under existing IMF and WTO 
provisions, in addition to the problems presented by each other those options, 
amending existing IMF and WTO provisions could potentially lead to desirable 
outcomes.141 
Amending the Articles of IMF, may restore, to some degree, the IMF’s 
power over foreign exchange rates from 1946 to 1971.142 However, two potential 
problems may arise. First, Article XXVIII of the IMF Agreement requires an 
eighty-five percent majority vote of IMF members for approval of amendments 
to the Articles.143 “The majority of countries seem to believe that the present 
currency exchange system is working reasonably well and demonstrate little 
desire to amend current IMF rules.”144 Second, most countries would be hesitant 
to restore the IMF’s previous strict powers over exchange rates because doing so 
essentially grants the IMF regulatory powers over all future matters concerning 
exchange rates. This could be interpreted as an intrusion into sovereign 
 
135. See GATT 1994, supra note 119; see also Staiger &Sykes, supra note 17. 
136. GATT 1994, supra note 119. 
137. See id. at art. XV(2). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See supra Part III.B. 
141. See supra Part III.B. 
142. See supra Part III.B.  
143. IMF Agreement, supra note 96, at art. XXVIII.  
144. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 8 (2011). 
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policymaking.145 “For example, if the IMF is granted the power to declare 
China’s RMB undervalued and to require appreciation, it would also have the 
power to declare the dollar or the euro overvalued and require the United States 
or European countries to adjust their domestic policies to depreciate the relative 
value of their respective currencies.”146 
Another option may be to amend WTO’s current definition of export subsidy 
to include currency manipulation.147 However, the amendment process basically 
requires the unanimous consent of all Members.148 Countries that are accused of 
currency manipulation can easily prevent the amendment from passing.149 
Therefore, any change in the WTO provisions will likely be the result of bilateral 
or multilateral trade negotiations, where Members that believe currency 
“adjustment” is an acceptable trade practice can be persuaded to change their 
practices by other incentives.150 Unable to overcome the hurdles necessary to 
amend IMF and WTO provisions, the U.S. government looked to find solutions 
in its domestic laws.151 
IV. UNITED STATES’ PAST EFFORTS 
The Obama administration and the prior Bush administration have 
consistently favored diplomatic solutions in dealing with the currency dispute 
with China.152 As a result, the respective administrations have not pursued any 
multilateral or unilateral trade measures.153 While both administrations 
acknowledge that the RMB is significantly undervalued154 and believes that the 
undervalued RMB results in trade detriment to the United States,155 they also 
consider adversarial measures counterproductive.156 
  
 
145. Id. at 5. The concern for overreaching power was the main reason the IMF’s scope of regulation was 
limited. See supra Part III.A. 
146. JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 5. 
147. Id. at 6.  
148. Id. at 5. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. See infra Part IV. 
152. See generally U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
(May 4, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/china.aspx. 
153. See Karl Rusnak, U.S. Sitting Back on Currency Manipulation Problem, ECONOMY IN CRISIS (Nov. 
15, 2011), http://economyincrisis.org/content/us-sitting-back-currency-manipulation-problem. 
154. Chris Isidore, China-U.S. Trade Wars: What’s at Stake, CNNMONEY (Oct. 13, 2011, 9:25 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/13/news/international/china_us_trade/index.htm. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. 
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A.  Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination Act of 
1988 
The Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination Act, 
otherwise known as the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, gives 
the Treasury Department an oversight role that has not yet been employed to 
date.157 The Act requires the Treasury Department to conduct annual evaluations 
of the exchange policies of foreign countries and determine whether those 
countries are “manipulating” their currency as defined under IMF Article 
IV(1).158 If the Treasury Department deems such manipulation is present, it is 
then required to begin bilateral negotiations with the country at issue unless in 
doing so would threaten “vital national economic and security interests.”159 To 
date, the Treasury Department has declined to label China’s exchange practices 
as currency manipulation.160 
In 2007, a bill was proposed on Capitol Hill that would change the standard 
for finding manipulation under the 1988 Act.161 The proposed law would require 
the Treasury Department to find manipulation by any foreign country with 
“material” global and “significant” bilateral trade surpluses in the event a country 
has practiced “prolonged one-way intervention in the currency markets.”162 Under 
the proposed standard, the Treasury Department would undoubtedly find China 
to be a currency manipulator and initiate bilateral negotiations under the 1988 
Act.163 However, the proposed legislation lacked bipartisan support due to a 
concern of a potential trade war with China and was abandoned.164 
B.  Countervailing Duties 
As previously discussed, a country whose import-competing industries are 
threatened or “materially injured” by the export subsidization of another country 
has a right under current WTO provisions to impose countervailing duties to 
offset the injury.165 However, U.S. law precludes the use of countervailing duties 
against exports from non-market economies.166 Before 2007, the U.S. Department 
of Commerce labeled China as a non-market economy and reasoned that the 
 
157. See 22 U.S.C. § 5304 (1998). 
158. Id. § 5304(b). 
159. Id.  
160. Anna Yukhananov, U.S. Declines to Name China Currency Manipulator, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2012, 
5:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-usa-china-treasury-idUSBRE8AQ19V20121127. 
161. Currency Reform and Financial Market Access Act of 2007, S. 1677, 110th Cong. (2007). 
162. Id. § 102(a)(b)(2)(A)-(C). 
163. See id.  
164. See id. 
165. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 111, at art. 19.  
166. TODD B. TATELMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV, RL 33976, UNITED STATES’ TRADE REMEDY 
LAWS AND NON-MARKET ECONOMIES: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 5 (2007). 
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extent of entanglement in the intervention the Chinese government had in its 
market made it impossible to identify export subsidies.167 However, in 2007, the 
Department of Commerce changed its position and found that China’s economy 
had developed sufficiently for the application of countervailing duty law.168 To 
clear up the legal uncertainties accompanying this shift in views, various bills 
have been proposed on Capitol Hill that would give the Department of 
Commerce the explicit authority to use countervailing duties against non-market 
economy.169 
However, even if U.S. law allows countervailing duties in case of an 
economy such as China’s, other problems still remain. First, as discussed earlier, 
it is unclear whether China’s exchange practices can be considered to confer 
“subsidies” within the meaning of that term under WTO law.170 Any decision by 
the United States to apply countervailing duties on that basis would likely result 
in a WTO challenge.171 Likewise, it is unclear whether current U.S. antidumping 
law172 can be interpreted in such a way as to treat China’s currency practices as a 
counter-available subsidy, although some proposals in Washington aim to amend 
U.S. law to cover such currency practices.173 
Second, countervailing duties are only available in situations in which 
subsidized import competition is “[causing] or threaten[ing] material injury” to a 
competing domestic industry.174 Individual firms are required to bring costly 
cases in front of the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to establish 
material injury for any “industry” in which countervailing duties are sought.175 
Lastly, a “countervailing duty may do little to benefit on an import-competing 
industry.”176 Since a countervailing duty remedy will apply only to China in this 
case, it may have no benefits to the import-competing industry that is competing 
with imports from multiple foreign countries at approximately the same price.177 
 
167. Coated Free Sheet Paper From the People’s Republic of China: Amended Preliminary Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 17484-01 (Apr. 9, 2007). 
168. Id.  
169. See, e.g., H.R. 708, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1229, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2942, 110th Cong. 
(2007); S. 364, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 974, 110th Cong. (2007). 
170. See supra Part III.C.1. 
171. See supra Part III.C.1. 
172. Antidumping law refers to laws designed to prevent antidumping from foreign countries. Dumping 
occurs when foreign products are sold in the domestic market at “below cost,” thereby diminishing the domestic 
producers’ ability to remain competitive in the marketplace. See infra Part IV.C. 
173. See, e.g., H.R. 782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2942,110th Cong. (2007); S. 364, 110th Cong. (2007). 
174. GATT 1994, supra note 119, at art. VI:6(a); Tariff Act of 1930,19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1671. 
175. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 614. 
176. Id. An import-competing industry is “a domestic industry that produces the same or a close 
substitute good that competes in the domestic market with imports” of foreign goods. TURLEY MINGS & 
MATTHEW MARLIN, THE STUDY OF ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, CONCEPTS & APPLICATIONS ch. 15 (6th ed. 
1999), available at http://www.mhhe.com/cls/econ/define.mhtml?CHAPTER=ch15. 
177. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 614. 
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Therefore, it is unclear how many domestic firms would pursue a costly 
countervailing duty remedy from the U.S. International Trade Commission.178 
For these reasons, commentators are skeptical of the viability of the 
countervailing duty option.179 However, because countervailing duties are a 
unilateral policy that can be imposed without approval from the IMF or WTO, 
“[t]hey can be imposed for a significant amount of time without incurring any 
formal international sanction even if they would later prove to be illegal under 
WTO law.”180 The mere suggestion of countervailing duties may also pressure 
China to temporarily relax its currency policy.181 Nevertheless, something as 
extreme as a blanket “tariff” on Chinese goods is unlikely to be imposed, and the 
United States may seek to amend its existing laws to combat the currency 
undervaluation in specific industries.182 
C.  United States’ Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China 
The United States has applied anti-dumping laws to maintain “fair pricing” 
for its imports for almost a century.183 Consequently, the Tariff Act of 1930 
(“Tariff Act”) was amended to incorporate the international anti-dumping 
provisions to provide a legal basis for enforcement of such provisions in the 
United States.184 
Dumping occurs when imported goods are sold below fair market value,185 
either causing, or threatening to cause, material injury, to the domestic industry 
producing similar products.186 The Tariff Act provides that the United States shall 
investigate possible dumping practices by foreign companies and impose 
additional duties to offset any pricing disadvantages suffered by the domestic 
industry.187 
Anti-dumping investigations may be petitioned by a domestic industry.188 The 
investigatory responsibilities are shared between the ITC and the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (“DoC”).189 The DoC investigates whether certain sales 
are below fair market value, and the ITC investigates whether there has been 
 
178. Id. 
179. Id.; see also Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 457. 
180. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 17, at 614. 
181. Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 457. 
182. See infra Part IV.C. 
183. See Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMES: A Love Story, Nonmarket and Market Economy Status Under U.S. 
Antidumping Law, 30 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 369, 372 (1999). 
184. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2004). 
185. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2004). 
186. Id. § 1677(7). 
187. See id. § 1671. 
188. Id. § 1671(a). 
189. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2004). 
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material injury to the domestic industry.190 If both agencies find in the 
affirmative, the DoC issues an anti-dumping duty order to impose a 
countervailing duty in a percentage equal to the average amount by which the 
foreign market value exceeds the domestic price.191 
Similar to countervailing duty, anti-dumping remedy will only be allowed in 
industries where material injury can be established, and where individual firms 
are willing to bring expensive cases in front of the DoC and ITC.192 This 
unilateral option is also highly problematic under WTO law.193 Dumping occurs 
at the firm-level when exporting firms sell goods at a lower price to foreign 
markets, or when goods are sold “below cost.”194 Under China’s currency policy, 
the behavior of its exporting firms simply does not meet the dumping 
definition.195 A great illustration is provided in Robert W. Staiger and Alan O. 
Sykes’ article, ‘Currency Manipulation’ and the World Trade: 
Suppose that a Chinese firm sells a widget for 10 RMB at home (F.O.B.), 
and sells an identical widget in the United States for 10 RMB at home 
(F.O.B.). From the firm’s perspective, it has realized identical amounts 
from each transaction, but under the proposed legislation, the “export 
price” would be found to be less than the “normal value” [because the 
United States considers the Chinese RMB to be undervalued.]196 
A finding of “dumping” under these circumstances would both pervert the 
concept of antidumping and also violate the WTO Antidumping Agreement.197 
The agreement “provides that when the comparison requires a conversion of 
currencies, the exchange rate shall be the ‘rate of exchange on the date of 
sale.’”198 This language can be read to refer to the actual exchange rate of the 
market at the date of comparison, not what the United States deems to be the 
“real” exchange rate for the dollar-yuan.199 
The methods used by the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine 
antidumping had also caught a great deal of criticism by supporters of 
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the evidence supporting antidumping laws and the reality of antidumping 
practice.201 Specifically, the laws as currently written and enforced do not reliably 
identify either price discrimination or below-cost sales.202 One study shows that 
only one of the five different calculation methodologies used by the Department 
of Commerce has any relevance in determining price discrimination, and only 
two of the 107 affirmative dumping findings used to support U.S. antidumping 
law relied exclusively on this methodology.203 The study further criticizes the 
Department of Commerce for not differentiating between price discrimination 
and below-cost sales resulting from government interventionism and from 
perfectly normal marketplace behavior.204 Lastly, the study argues that the 
antidumping law unfairly punishes foreign firms for business practices routinely 
engaged in by American firms.205 With no support from the international laws and 
current domestic laws, the U.S. Congress looks to enact new legislation that 
would enable its government to unilaterally punish China’s currency practices. 
V. THE CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE OVERSIGHT REFORM ACT OF 2011 
The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act, first introduced in 
Congress in 2007, then again in 2009, 2010, and 2011, marked the efforts by the 
United States to enact legislation that would allow it to combat currency 
manipulation on the open market.206 Its most recent version, the Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, was the only one of the four that 
was successfully introduced in one of the congressional houses.207 Despite 
passing the Senate, the bill received no attention from the House of 
Representatives and eventually died.208 Nevertheless, since China’s exchange rate 
policy remains a hot topic in Washington, its content remains relevant as a 
framework for future currency oversight acts. 
A.  How Does the Law Change with Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform 
Act? 
Under existing U.S. trade law, countervailing duties can only be imposed on 
imported goods from countries that had been deemed a currency manipulator by 
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the Department of Commerce and International Trade Commission.209 Though the 
Department of Commerce already has authority under current U.S. trade law to 
investigate whether currency undervaluation by a foreign government provides a 
counteravailable subsidy, it is not required to put forth such investigation at the 
request of U.S. industries.210 And as previously discussed, the standard for 
counteravailable subsidy under current U.S. trade laws has not yet been 
successfully applied to any country and will not likely be applicable to China’s 
currency practices.211 
However, the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 
changes how counteravailable subsidy is defined. Similar to current laws, the bill 
would allow the U.S. government to “treat currency manipulation as an unfair 
subsidy and an illegal trade practice, allowing countervailing duties to be 
imposed on” imported products from countries manipulating their currencies to 
prevent those products from flooding the domestic market.212 However, the bill 
repeals the currency provisions in current law and replaces them with a new 
framework based on objective criteria.213 
First, the bill requires the U.S. Treasury to identify misaligned currencies on 
the market and develop biannual reports to Congress.214 On the report, misaligned 
currencies are either put in a “general category of ‘fundamentally misaligned 
currencies’ based on observed objective criteria,” or “‘fundamentally misaligned 
currencies for priority action’ that reflects misaligned currencies caused by clear 
policy actions by the relevant government.”215 The Treasury is then required to 
seek advice from the International Monetary Fund and key trade partners about 
countries with “priority” currencies.216 Countries with “priority” currencies are 
then given 360 days to correct the misalignment, and if the misalignment is not 
corrected, unilateral actions may be taken.217 Second, the bill now requires the 
Department of Commerce to investigate a foreign government for currency 
undervaluation if a U.S. industry requests investigate and provides the proper 
documentation.218 Lastly, the bill eliminates the bright-line rule that exists under 
the current law, which precludes the Department of Commerce from finding a 
counteravailable subsidy unless the subsidy benefits only the export industry of 
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that country.219 This bright-line rule was one of the hurdles that the Department of 
Commerce had in dealing with China, because China’s currency exchange 
practices applied to all industries, though it mostly benefited the export sector.220 
Supporters of the bill claim that by revaluing Chinese currency, the bill could 
create more than two million U.S. jobs and boost the U.S. economy by nearly 
$300 billion in less than two years.221 Despite its supporters’ optimism and its 
overwhelming support in the Senate, the bill caught tremendous backlash just 
days after its success in the Senate. 
B.  The End of Future Currency Oversight Acts?: The United States-South 
Korea Free Trade Agreement 
“South Korea is currently the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner 
and eighth-largest export market” importing $37.587 billion and exporting 
$29.085 billion from January to August of 2011.222 On October 12, 2011, the U.S. 
Congress approved the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with an 
overwhelming majority in the Senate (83-15) and a strong majority in the House 
of Representatives (278-151).223 First signed by the Bush administration in 2007 
and re-proposed by President Obama on October 3, 2011, the FTA was said to 
boost domestic employment and expand commerce with South Korea.224 
Economic experts believe the FTA was designed to “reduce the cost of U.S. 
goods and services exported to foreign markets, and also reduce the cost of 
foreign goods and services imported into the United States, which makes for 
greater trading parity.”225 
Prior to the implementation of the FTA, only thirty-eight “percent of U.S. 
tariff lines226 and [thirteen] percent of Korean tariff lines . . . have free rates of 
duty.”227 
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Upon implementation . . . , more than [eighty-two] percent of U.S. tariff 
lines and more than [eighty] percent of Korean tariff lines would have 
free rates of duty . . . [and] [a]pproximately [ninety-nine] percent of U.S. 
tariff lines and 98 percent of Korean tariff lines would have free rates of 
duty” within ten years after implementation.228 
Although the projected GDP increase in the United States is a mere 0.1 percent, 
the U.S. textiles and apparel sector, as well as the passenger vehicles sector, are 
expected to experience an import increase of eighty-five to ninety percent and 
fifty-five to fifty-seven percent, respectively.229 The FTA also represents the 
strengthening political ties between the United States and South Korea.230 
President Obama has said that this agreement “is also a win for the strong 
alliance between the United States and South Korea, which for decades has 
ensured that the security that has maintained stability on the peninsula 
continues.”231 
The congressional approval of the FTA just nine days after the U.S. Senate 
passed the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 sparked 
tremendous backlash with the Chinese government and economic analysts all 
over the world.232 One popular Chinese newspaper dubbed this apparent 
contradiction as the “coexistence of liberalistic and protectionist approaches” in 
the United States.233 Jeong Young-sik, a senior research fellow at the Samsung 
Economic Research Institute, said “the bills are about politics as well about 
economics.”234 He argues that the U.S. Senate’s support of the bill was caused by 
a need to persuade voters into believing that the economic downturn and high 
unemployment rate resulted from external factors such as the trade deficit with 
China.235 From an economic perspective, Jeong believes it was a mistake to 
support South Korea over China, as China has a greater trade surplus with the 
United States and there is little room in South Korea for additional stimulus 
policies due to the size of its economy.236 Furthermore, others believe the United 
States is taking a “misguided approach” with China in its attempt to impose 
punitive tariff on Chinese goods.237 “Statistics showed that the Chinese Renminbi 
[RMB] has appreciated more than [thirty] percent against the U.S. dollar since 
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2005 . . . [and] [o]ver the same period, the U.S. . . . [unemployment] rate has 
risen from [seven] percent to [nine] percent . . . .”238 Economists argue such 
statistics indicate that the RMB’s value has little to do with the U.S. 
unemployment rate, and demanding the RMB to further appreciate will not 
produce the opposite result.239 
VI. THE POWER OF ACTION IN INACTION 
Many news articles and scholarly reports label China as a “currency 
manipulator” and call for unilateral actions from the United States to equalize the 
competitive edge that Chinese exporters have gained through China’s foreign 
exchange rate regime.240 However, opponents to this view (though not necessarily 
supporters of China’s policy) forward three arguments contending that no 
unilateral actions should be pursued by the United States against China.241 
First, the opponents argue that the United States simply has no control over 
what China does with its foreign exchange policies.242 Under IMF and WTO 
rules, countries cannot unilaterally impose domestic policies with the aim to 
affect or control another country’s currency exchange rate.243 If the United States 
were to take unilateral actions, such as imposing a tariff using The Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, China could successfully bring a 
complaint against the United States at the WTO.244 
Second, even if the United States is able to force the appreciation of the 
RMB, the result may be the opposite of what U.S. policymakers want.245 The 
undervalued RMB allows China to export Chinese goods to the United States at 
“relatively inexpensive” rates, enabling U.S. consumers to increase their 
consumption and purchasing power.246 Likewise, certain U.S. producers import 
from China to produce finished goods for sale, and these producers are able to 
take advantage of the undervalued RMB to both lower the price of these products 
and remain more competitive in the marketplace.247 As a result, appreciating the 
RMB could result in an increase in the price of China-made consumer products 




240. Dustin Ensinger, Currency Manipulation Undermining U.S., ECON. IN CRISIS (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://economyincrisis.org/content/currency-manipulation-undermining-us; Scott, supra note 25.  
241. See Kaneene, supra note 60; And Now, Protectionism, supra note 15.  
242. Good to Know One’s Limits, ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
freeexchange/2010/03/chinas_currency_7. 
243. And Now, Protectionism, supra note 15. 
244. Id. 
245. WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 24-27 (2011). 
246. Id. at 25. 
247. Id. 
[7] YU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:15 PM 
2013 / The Power of Action in Inaction 
602 
“less money to spend on other goods and services” while also making certain 
U.S. producers less competitive.248 Furthermore, the undervalued RMB provides 
incentive for the Chinese government and Chinese investors to purchase U.S. 
Treasury securities and other U.S. assets.249 This demand results in the lowering 
of interest rates, which benefits U.S. borrowers, as well as funds the U.S. federal 
budget deficits.250 China currently holds approximately $1.16 trillion in U.S. 
Treasury securities, which makes it the United States’ largest foreign holder of 
such securities, with 25.7 percent of total foreign holdings.251 An appreciation of 
the RMB may lessen the need for China to purchase U.S. Treasury securities and 
result in an increase of U.S. domestic interest rates.252 In the “worst case 
scenario,” if China stops purchasing securities when the federal budget deficit is 
unusually high, “it could destabilize financial markets by throwing into doubt the 
U.S. government’s ability to sustain its current fiscal policy.”253 
Lastly, some analysts believe the problem will correct itself as China will 
soon be inclined to allow the RMB to appreciate at its own volition due to its 
own domestic demands.254 Before discussing why China will be inclined to allow 
the RMB float, it is important to revisit the purpose behind China’s policy. The 
Chinese government justifies their policies by arguing that their currency regime 
“foster[s] economic stability through currency stability . . . [and] reflects the 
government’s goal of using exports as a way of providing jobs to Chinese 
workers and to attract [foreign direct investments] in order to gain access to 
technology and know-how.”255 However, critics contend that China’s policy of 
focusing on export growth and currency control actually negatively impact 
China’s economy.256 First, China’s currency policy may create an 
overdependence on exports.257 A study by the IMF estimated that exports 
accounted for over sixty percent of China’s GDP in the last decade, an increase 
of twenty percent from the previous decade.258 Even China’s former Premier, 
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Wen Jiabao, recognized this problem when he stated “the biggest problem with 
China’s economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and 
unsustainable.”259 Second, an undervalued RMB makes foreign goods more 
expensive for both Chinese producers and consumers.260 By benefiting the export 
industry at the expense of other industries, China may find itself unable to 
efficiently allocate and utilize its economic resources, with the majority of the 
resources being diverted to the export section.261 Furthermore, China’s policy is in 
effect “subsidizing American living standards by selling products that are less 
expensive than they would be under market conditions.”262 Consequently, 
Chinese consumers have to pay more for foreign goods because their currency is 
undervalued and has lower purchasing power in the marketplace.263 
Finally, using a pegged exchange regime severely limits China’s ability to 
raise interest rate to control inflation.264 By purchasing U.S. Treasury securities, 
China “must first convert yuan to dollars, thereby releasing more Chinese 
currency” into the market, increasing inflation.265 This increase in interest rate 
will entice foreign investors to transfer funds into the Chinese market, thereby 
forcing the central government to purchase more foreign currencies to soak up 
excessive supply.266 Though the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) is trying to 
counterbalance this inflation by simultaneously selling PBOC bonds to soak up 
the excess yuan in the market, the process had not been especially effective.267 
Furthermore, PBOC bonds have relatively high interest rates, about 5.31 
percent,268 while U.S. Treasury securities have an interest rate near zero for short 
term investments.269 As China continues to purchase more U.S. Treasury 
securities and sell more PBOC bonds to foreign investors, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to maintain its current policy.270 
As a result, China has experienced incredible fluctuations in inflation rates from 
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2009 to 2011.271 These fluctuations translate into rising food prices, an increase of 
13.4 percent from September 2010 to September 2011, which proves to be 
especially taxing on Chinese consumers.272 These negative effects support the 
view that China will be compelled to appreciate its currency in the coming years 
due to market forces.273 Therefore, it would be wiser for the United States to 
simply let China’s currency situation work itself out, instead of attempting to 
unilaterally sanction China.274 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A brief look at China’s economic growth over the three decades provides 
undisputable proof that its economic policies worked, and worked far better than 
any other country in the world in that same period of time.275 However, this 
unprecedented rate of growth is not without its consequences.276 By pegging its 
currency exchange rate and not allowing it to appreciate and depreciate with 
market forces, the Chinese government disproportionately benefited its export 
sectors at the expense of its own domestic consumers.277 And while its export 
sectors experienced tremendous growth and China’s foreign exchange reserve is 
now the largest in the world at $3.3 trillion (forty-six percent of the world’s total 
national reserves),278 its domestic consumers are left with an undervalued 
currency that has less purchasing power than what it is actually worth.279 With 
uncontrollable price fluctuations in the domestic market, China looked for ways 
to shed its dependency on foreign currencies for importing foreign 
commodities.280 
On December 25, 2011, China and Japan announced plans to promote the 
direct exchange of their currencies.281 This agreement will allow firms to convert 
the Chinese and Japanese currencies directly into each other, bypassing the need 
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to use dollars.282 Under the current foreign exchange policies, governments and 
firms that wish to purchase commodities must first exchange their individual 
currencies to foreign currencies.283 This exchange results in transaction costs that 
can be avoided by purchasing and selling commodities using the global reserve 
currency held by the two countries, which is currently dominated by the dollar – 
accounting for more than sixty percent of the global foreign exchange reserves.284 
Although Japan is not the only country China has a currency swap agreement 
with, Japan is currently the world’s third largest economy—just behind the 
United States and China—and China’s biggest trading partner.285 This alarming 
trend of major economies, especially in Asia, now adopting currency swap 
agreements to shed the Western dollar influence is said to be the “end of dollar 
hegemony” and the start of a “new international financial architecture” with the 
Chinese RMB soon becoming an internationalized currency.286 This shift in the 
international financial architecture suggests that China has incentives to allow its 
currency to appreciate, at least to a certain extent, in order establish the RMB as a 
global exchange currency.287 
The United States should avoid seeking to unilaterally impose countervailing 
duties on Chinese goods, as it will damage both its foreign relations with China 
and hurt its domestic consumers.288 Furthermore, without support from the IMF 
and WTO, unilateral actions by the United States are subjected to attack in the 
international community and to claims through the WTO.289 Instead, the United 
States should look to correct its own domestic economic policies to allow its own 
domestic industries to be more competitive in the open market.290 With respect to 
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